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Abstract
In the United States fringe benefits are now more than 30% of compensation. While
many studies have focused on the impact of trade with developing countries on U.S.
wages, not much attention has been given to the impact of such trade on other compo-
nents of compensation. But if trade a↵ects the share of benefits in compensation, the
studies which focus on wages and ignore fringe benefits likely give us biased estimates of
the e↵ect of trade on workers’ total compensation and consumption. I use data about
individual workers’ fringe benefits from the NLSY79. I focus on workers who worked
in manufacturing in 1991 and I follow them up to 2006. I then combine this individual
level dataset with a measure of exposure to Chinese imports at the industry level and
with an instrument for it, as in Autor et al. (2014). I estimate the e↵ect of Chinese
import competition on fringe benefits to be positive and economically and statistically
significant. The results are robust to the inclusion of several individual and industry
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level control variables. Di↵erently from previous studies, my results suggest a more
optimistic view of the e↵ect of trade with China on U.S. workers’ overall compensation.
Keywords: Fringe Benefits, Trade Flows, Compensation.
JEL Classification: F16, I13, J32
1 Introduction
While many studies have focused on the impact of trade with developing countries on U.S.
wages, not much attention has been given to the impact of trade on other components of
compensation. This is remarkable given that in the U.S. benefits are now more than 30%
of compensation (Bureau of Labor Statistics (2015, Table A)). Moreover, benefits do not
necessarily change over time at the same rate as wages. Indeed, for the 1987-2007 period,
Pierce (2010) finds that the employer costs for hourly wage, health insurance benefits and
retirement benefits increased, respectively, by 4.5%, 76% and 4.2%.1 If the share of benefits
in compensation is not constant, the studies which focus on wages and ignore fringe benefits
may miss an important margin of adjustment of compensation in response to a trade shock.
This paper aims at filling this gap in the literature by studying how imports of manufacturing
from China a↵ects employer-provided fringe benefits.2
The growth of trade between U.S. and China since the 1990s has been well documented.
The increase in U.S. imports, as a fraction of GDP, is mainly due to the increase in U.S.
imports from developing countries, with in turn this increase been mainly due to China
1My calculations from Table 2.1 in Pierce (2010).
2Note that some fringe benefits, such as Social Security and unemployment insurance, are legally required
and so they cannot be adjusted without violating the law. The focus here is on non-legally required fringe
benefits: arguably, at least in U.S., these benefits can more easily be adjusted in response to a shock. At the
end of 2006, the last year in my sample, benefits were 30.1% of compensation and legally required benefits
were 8% of compensation (Bureau of Labor Statistics (2007)).
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(Krugman (2008, Figure 3) and Autor et al. (2014)). The di↵erence in labor compensation
between the U.S. and China is also large.3 This o↵ers both challenges and opportunities
for U.S. workers. On one hand, competition from China may undercut the compensation of
U.S. workers. On the other hand, as in Melitz (2003), trade may bring productivity increases
which allow the compensation of U.S. workers to increase.
Trade may not only a↵ect overall compensation but also its composition. In particular,
trade may change the share of benefits in compensation through several channels. For
example, if benefits are a luxury good for workers, then a trade-induced change in overall
compensation will also a↵ect the wage-benefits mix. Even if benefits are not a luxury good,
trade may a↵ect the size of the firm a worker works at.4 In turn, this may change the share
of benefits in compensation because larger firms are more likely to o↵er fringe benefits to
workers (Bureau of Labor Statistics (2015, Table 8)).
To empirically explore the impact of trade on benefits, I use individual workers data from
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). Similarly to Autor et al. (2014),
I focus on workers who worked in manufacturing in 1991 and I follow them up to 2006. I
then combine this individual level dataset with a measure of Chinese import competition
at the industry level and with an instrument for it. To preview the results, suppose that a
worker works in 1991 in manufacturing industry j. I find that, on average, the higher the
Chinese import competition for j between 1991 and 2006, the higher the total number of
years the worker is covered by employment-sponsored health insurance (EHI hereafter) and
participates in an employment-sponsored retirement plan (ERP hereafter) during the 1992-
3In 2008 the hourly compensation costs in China’s manufacturing sector were only 4 percent of those in
the United States (Banister and Cook (2011)).
4As in Melitz (2003), trade may a↵ect the size of a worker’s current firm and trade may also reallocate
workers from, say, smaller firms to larger firms.
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2006 period.5 Chinese import competition also increases the total number of other fringe
benefits (such as life insurance and maternity leave) available to the worker during the period.
The results are robust to the inclusion of several individual and industry level controls. These
results cast a more positive light on trade with China than what was previously found in
other studies such as Autor et al. (2014).
There is now a large literature on the e↵ect of Chinese imports on the U.S. labor market.
Some studies find overall negative e↵ects. For example, Autor et al. (2013) find that wages
decrease and unemployment increase in local labor markets which are more exposed to import
competition from China. Other studies report more mixed results. For example, Kemeny
et al. (2015) find that Chinese import competition is associated with an increase in job loss
for lower skill workers but it is not significantly related to job losses for workers with at least
a college degree. Lake and Millimet (2015) find that Chinese import penetration destroys
bad jobs but also creates good jobs. I find that Chinese imports are positively associated
with fringe benefits, an important characteristic of a good job.
A more recent strand of literature looks at the e↵ect of trade on the non-monetary
components of compensation. McManus and Schaur (2014) show that Chinese imports
are associated with increased injury rates in the competing U.S. manufacturing industries,
especially at smaller establishments. McManus and Schaur (2015) and Pierce and Schott
(2015) report a negative e↵ect of Chinese imports on health insurance coverage but their
focus is mainly on the e↵ect of Chinese imports on health across local labor markets. They
also do not distinguish health insurance coverage provided by the employer from other forms
of health insurance coverage. Instead, my focus is on the e↵ect of Chinese trade on non-
5It is more common to say that a worker is covered by EHI and participates in an ERP. For convenience
in what follows I use coverage and participation interchangeably to refer to both benefits.
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wage monetary components of compensation.6 Finally, Autor et al. (2013) study how trade
with China a↵ects the transfer of public benefits to workers such as Medicare and disability
payments.
One of the main focuses of the literature is to identify how trade a↵ects an individual’s
income, where income is taken as a proxy for overall compensation, ignoring fringe benefits.
But even if a worker does not receive any fringe benefits, her consumption, rather than
her income, is arguably a better indicator of her welfare ((Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007, p.
45)). If trade a↵ects the relative prices of consumer goods, then focusing only on the e↵ect
of trade on income may miss other important e↵ects of trade on welfare. For this reason
another literature studies the e↵ect of trade on consumption (see e.g. Porto (2006) and
Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2014)). Like income, fringe benefits are a component of an
individual’s overall compensation but, being in-kind and so non-monetary, they are also part
of an individual’s consumption bundle. By studying the e↵ect of trade on fringe benefits,
this paper straddles the two literatures on the e↵ect of trade on income and on consumption.
Methodologically, this paper is most closely related to the seminal works of Kosteas
(2008) and of Autor et al. (2014). Kosteas (2008) also uses the NLSY79 to study the e↵ect
of trade with less-developed countries but he focuses on wages and on an earlier period.
Autor et al. (2014) use instead Social Security data and focus on the impact of Chinese
trade on a variety of labor market outcomes. I follow these papers in using the variation
of trade across industries to identify the e↵ect of trade on the outcome of interest.7 Autor
6The risk of injury studied in previous work is a non-wage and non-monetary component of compensation
as opposed to fringe benefits which are a non-wage but monetary component of compensation (Hamermesh
(1999)). While fringe benefits are a large component of compensation in a developed country such as the
United States, they can be important in developing countries too. For example, during China’s transforma-
tion to a more market-oriented economy, when many state owned enterprises closed, their employees lost
the pension and health insurance benefits associated with their jobs (Barber and Yao (2010) and Naughton
(2007)).
7Alternative strategies consist in using the geographical variation of trade across distinct geographic
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et al. (2014) are also the first to instrument the change in Chinese imports to U.S. with the
change in Chinese imports to other rich countries, a strategy I follow here.
Section 2 discusses various mechanisms through which in theory trade may a↵ect benefits.
Section 3 presents the econometric model while Section 4 discusses the variables in the
analysis and the data sources. Section 5 contains the results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Motivation
The goal of this section is to argue that trade may a↵ect the share of benefits in total
compensation. If so, focusing on the e↵ect of trade on wages, while ignoring benefits, may
give us an incomplete picture of the e↵ect of trade on workers’ total compensation. A basic
model used to study how the share of benefits in compensation is determined is the following
(see e.g. Currie and Madrian (1999, p. 3364)). Suppose that the worker’s utility function
is U(W,B) where W are her wages and B are her benefits, both expressed in dollars. The
utility function is concave and monotonic. The overall cost of a worker to her employer is
denoted with C, which is also expressed in dollars. This cost includes the wage and benefits
cost of compensating a worker. The employer can “convert” C dollars into wages and benefits
according to the o↵er curve C = PBB +W where PB is the “price” of a dollar of benefits in
terms of a dollar of wages. This price captures in a simple way the fact that some employers
may be more e↵ective at providing benefits than others, i.e. their PB will be lower. The
relationship C = PBB +W acts therefore as a budget constraint for the worker who will
choose her preferred bundle out of those o↵ered to her.
units, as e.g. in Autor et al. (2013) and Kovak (2013), or constructing a measure of trade exposure at the
occupational level as e.g. in Liu and Trefler (2011) and Ebenstein et al. (2014).
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A worker then solves:
max
W,B
U(W,B) s.t. PBB +W = C (1)
This simple formulation shows that the equilibrium bundle (W,B) is a↵ected by changes
in C and/or PB. Existing trade models provide some mechanism through which trade may
a↵ect C and/or PB.
At first, for the sake of exposition, let’s assume that trade does not a↵ect PB but possi-
bly only C. For example, according to the model in Melitz (2003), trade increases workers’
productivity and so it bids up the amount that firms are willing to pay for them, i.e. C.
Suppose that, for workers, benefits are a luxury good relative to wage compensation, as
found e.g. in Woodbury (1983). In this case, then trade will increase the ratio B/W : with
the higher compensation, a worker increases benefits more than proportionally than wages.
In this case, ignoring benefits under-estimates the beneficial e↵ect of trade on compensation.
Instead, according to the Ricardian specific factors model, a worker who has accumulated
some industry-specific human capital will see her compensation go down with an increase in
import competition (Attanasio et al. (2004)). In this case, with a lower total compensation
o↵ered, if benefits are a luxury good, the worker will reduce the share of benefits in com-
pensation. In this scenario, ignoring benefits under-estimates the adverse e↵ect of trade on
the compensation of workers in import-competing industries.
Now, still for the sake of exposition, let’s focus on the possible e↵ect of trade on PB,
ignoring its e↵ect on C. For example, according to the model in Melitz (2003), trade also
reallocates workers toward larger firms. But the price of benefits PB is likely to be lower at
larger firms. Indeed, there is evidence that larger employers o↵er more benefits than smaller
7
employers.8 This could be due for example to the fixed costs of administering a retirement
or an health insurance plan. When faced with a lower relative price of benefits, even with
an unchanged C, workers will likely increase the share of benefits in compensation B/W .9
In this case, a regression of wages on trade will miss the fact that benefits have increased
more than proportionally than wages. Again, this point reiterates the need of studying the
e↵ect of trade on benefits.
It is also possible that trade instead increases the price of benefits faced by workers. For
example, because of import competition, workers may move out of manufacturing and into
services (see e.g. Ebenstein et al. (2014)). Henly and Sanchez (2009, Fig. 1) document that
the average size of U.S. establishments in manufacturing is much larger than in the service
sectors. Therefore, a worker who leaves manufacturing for the services sector may move to
a smaller establishment where he will likely face a higher relative price of benefits.
The discussion above suggests that trade may a↵ect the share of benefits in compensation.
This is because trade may a↵ect PB and/or C and, when C and/or PB change, the share
of benefits in compensation may change as well. This observation motivates the empirical
study of the e↵ect of trade on benefits.10
8Woodbury (1983, p. 174) finds that B/W is higher at larger employers. For specific evidence on pension
benefits and health insurance benefits see, respectively, Kobe (2010) and Janicki (2013, Table 7). If one
thinks that these fixed costs are prohibitive for small employers, then this can be modeled with PB being
plus infinity for these employers. In this case, the o↵er curve degenerates to a single point, with the worker
being able to “choose” only the point W = C, with B = 0.
9Note that this does not require that benefits are a luxury good, just that the worker reacts to the lower
PB by substituting some wages for benefits.
10The simple model in (1) does not include the fact that in U.S. many fringe benefits are paid with pre-tax
dollars. This lowers the e↵ective price of benefits faced by workers. Because of trade, a worker’s gross income
could be pushed in a di↵erent tax bracket and this will a↵ect her e↵ective price of benefits. Because her
price of benefits has changed, she may change her wage-benefits mix even if benefits are not a luxury good
and the size of her firm has not changed. The possible interaction between trade and a worker’s marginal
tax rate provides an additional reason to study the e↵ect of trade on benefits.
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3 Empirical Model
For individual i at year t, let ehipi,t and erppi,t be a dummy for, respectively, participation
in EHI and participation in ERP. Let SY be the set containing years 1992, 1993, and every
even year between 1994 and 2006, with extremes included. Let SY 94 be the set containing
every even year between 1994 and 2006, with extremes included. I define Totehipi as equal
to
P
t2SY
ehipi,t, i.e. the total number of survey years individual i participated in EHI since
1992 to 2006.11 I also define Toterppi as
P
t2SY 94
erppi,t, i.e. the total number of survey years
i participated in ERP, where the restriction to SY 94 is due to the fact that information on
participation on ERP is available only since 1994. Finally, let also othfi,t be equal to the
total number of fringe benefits, other than EHI and ERP, available to i at year t through her
employer. These are benefits such as dental insurance and childcare; the full list of benefits
is reported in Section 4. I analogously define Totothfi as
P
t2SY
othfi,t, i.e. the total sum of
other benefits available to the worker during the period of interest. The baseline model for
these three fringe benefits is then the following:
Yi =↵ +   IPj(i,91) +  Xi +  Kj(i,91) + ✏i (2)
where Yi is in turn equal to Totehipi, Toterppi and Totothfi;  IPj(i,91) is defined below; Xi
is a vector of individual level variables which includes the number of survey years i reported
a job during the 1992-2006 period and other variables, most of which are measured in 1991;
j(i, 91) is the industry of individual i in 1991; Kj(i,91) is a vector of industry-level controls for
i’s industry j in 1991 (for simplicity, I will omit the arguments of the j function hereafter);
✏i is an error term. This model is very similar to the one used in Autor et al. (2014) with the
11The restriction to years in SY is due to the fact that the NLSY79 is available only biyearly since 1994.
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main di↵erence being that I study benefits while they focus on earnings. All the variables
are discussed in more detail in section 4.
The main regressor of interest is  IPj, defined as the change in U.S. industry j’s imports
from China between 1991 and 2006, normalized by U.S. consumption of industry j in 1991.
In symbols:
 IPj =
M chnj,06  M chnj,91
Yj,91 +Mj,91   EXj,91 (3)
where, for manufacturing industry j in 1991, M chnj,91 are imports from China into U.S., Yj,91,
Mj,91 and EXj,91 are, respectively, U.S. shipments, total imports and exports. Therefore,
the denominator of (3) measures total U.S. consumption of industry j’s good in 1991. In
what follows I refer to  IPj as change in U.S. exposure to Chinese imports.
I work with the sums of the participation dummies ehipi,t and erppi,t and with the sum
of the total availability of the other benefits othfi,t because I do not have data on the dollar
value of benefits for the period of interest.12 So, the focus here is on the extensive margin of
benefits adjustment, i.e. whether a worker is o↵ered benefits and whether the worker actually
participates in them. However, benefits can also be adjusted at the intensive margin, both
by the employer and the worker. For example, an employer may change the deductibles for
EHI or the matching contribution for ERP. Even if the employer does not change the benefits
o↵ered to the worker, the worker may e.g. decide to switch to a higher quality - and so more
expensive - EHI plan or to change its contribution to a ERP plan. In order to somewhat
account for this additional margin, I focus at first on EHI and ERP participation rather than
on EHI and ERP availability. This choice is not without problems. Indeed, participation in
benefits is driven by many more factors than benefits’ availability: if my regressors do not
12The NLSY79 contains some questions about the employer and employee contributions to ERP plans
only for the years since 1994 to 2000. Moreover, many respondents who participate in an ERP plan have
missing information for these questions.
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fully account for all of these other factors, it is possible that my estimate of the e↵ect of
 IPj on participation in benefits will be biased. For this reason, in the robustness checks I
also use EHI and ERP availability as dependent variables. Moreover, I also study how the
availability of fringe benefits other than EHI and ERP is a↵ected by  IPj.
Note that the regression in (2) is a cross-sectional one. A worker is assumed to be exposed
to a Chinese imports shock via her industry a liation in 1991, i.e. at the beginning of the
increase in Chinese imports into U.S. (Autor et al. (2013)). Since 1991 the worker may, for
example, switch industry in response to the shock or even stop working altogether. The
dependent variable summarizes, in regard to fringe benefits, the whole worker’s trajectory
during the period of interest. The coe cient of interest is  . Consider the case of   being
positive. In this case, the higher the change in exposure to Chinese imports for an industry
(since 1991 to 2006), then, other things being equal, the higher the number of years with
benefits (in the 1992-2006 survey years) for those who worked in that industry in 1991.
I cluster the standard errors at the industry level given that the independent variable of
interest varies at the industry level, not at the individual one.
It is important to understand which variation is captured in the regressor in (3). A shift
to the right of China’s export supply of good j to the U.S. will increase  IPj. This increase
in supply may be due to an increase in China’s productivity, to lower U.S. tari↵s on Chinese
goods or to lower transportation costs. While it may be interesting to estimate the e↵ect of
each channel separately, the focus here is on their aggregate e↵ect as each of them will make
U.S. industries more exposed to competition with China.
However,  IPj may also increase because the U.S. import demand of good j from China
shifts to the right. In this case, the regressor captures factors which are internal to the
U.S. and not related to China. To remove these factors, I follow Autor et al. (2014) and
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use as instrument the change in the exposure of other wealthy countries to Chinese imports
between 1991 and 2006,  IPOj, which is measured as:
 IPOj =
M ow,chnj,06  M ow,chnj,91
Yj,91 +Mj,91   EXj,91 (4)
where M ow,chnj,91 are industry j’s imports from China into other wealthy countries in 1991.
13
Notice that I do not have data on industry consumption for the other wealthy countries and
so I use data on U.S. industry consumption in the denominator.
The rationale for this instrument is as follows. Suppose e.g. that productivity in China
is increasing and that this increase is exogenous to the rest of the world. This increase
in productivity shifts to the right China’s export supply and makes Chinese goods more
attractive to the rest of the world. For this reason we should expect exports to China
to grow, not just in U.S., but also in other wealthy countries. The instrument captures
this exogenous variation in U.S. exposure to Chinese imports, eliminating other possibly
endogenous sources such as changes in demand for the industry’s product. I also subject the
results to a series of robustness checks which are discussed in Section 5.3.
4 Data
4.1 Dependent Variables and Sample Restrictions
The NLSY79 is a panel dataset of U.S. residents. Respondents were 14-22 years old in 1979,
the first year of the sample. The survey has been conducted each year up to 1994 and then
every even-numbered year since then. I focus on the 1991-2006 period for two reasons. First,
13These wealthy countries are Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and
Switzerland. These are the same countries used in Autor et al. (2014).
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as Autor et al. (2014) document, U.S. imports from China were small in the 80s and began
to rise fast in the 1990s and accelerate in the 2000s. Second, I also want to avoid the Great
Recession which started at the end of 2007.14 Given that the NLSY79 does not have data
for 2007, I use data up to 2006.
While the NLSY79 covers only a cohort of workers, it has the advantage of having some
information about the non-wage components of compensation. In particular, the NLSY79
contains information about the availability of EHI and ERP benefits to the respondent
through her employer and about the actual participation of the respondent to the plans
o↵ered to her. The questions about EHI and ERP availability are asked in each survey year
in the 1991-2006 period. The question about participation in an EHI plan is available in
1990 and since 1992 (but not in 1991) and the question about participation in a ERP plan
is only available since 1994. As explained above, as dependent variable I compute Totehipi,
i.e. the total number of years since 1992 to 2006 in which the respondent participates in
EHI. I do the same for participation in ERP (computing Toterppi) but using the 1994-2006
years because information on participation in ERP is only available since 1994. In robustness
checks, I also use as dependent variables the availability of EHI and ERP in the 1992-2006
period and, for a falsification test, the availability of EHI and ERP in the 1988-1991 period.
The NLSY79 also has information on the availability of these other fringe benefits: life
insurance, dental insurance, childcare, maternity and paternity leave, flexible hours or work
schedule, availability of sick days, availability of vacation days, training, and profit sharing.
For each respondent i in each year t, I compute othfi,t i.e. the total number of fringe
benefits, other than EHI and ERP, which are available to i through her employer: note that
othfi,t ranges from 0 (no other benefits available) to 9 (all the other benefits available). For
14This also allows me to avoid the period of the “trade collapse” - i.e. the sudden and sharp decline in
international trade - which started in the third quarter of 2008 (Baldwin (2009)).
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each respondent, I then sum othfi,t across survey years in the 1992-2006 period and obtain
Totothfi which I also use as dependent variable in my regressions.
I construct the income dependent variable along the lines of Autor et al. (2014), with the
limitations imposed by my data. In particular, I first sum the yearly real wage and salary
income for a respondent over the 1992-2005 period.15 I then divide this cumulative income
over the 1992-2006 period by the average wage and salary income over the 1988-1991 period.
My income dependent variable is then the cumulative income between 1992 and 2005 - for
the years for which survey data is available - expressed as a multiple of initial average income
in 1988-1991.
I impose the following sample restrictions. Similarly to Autor et al. (2014), I keep in-
formation only for those respondents who in 1991 reported being in manufacturing in their
primary job. I also keep only respondents who in 1991 reported a job in the private sector
as their primary job and who worked at least 20 hours a week in that job.16 I also keep only
those respondents who in 1991 reported a hourly wage higher than $3.80, i.e. the 1990 Fed-
eral minimum wage. Finally, I keep only workers with at least one interview in the 1992-2006
period and with non-missing values of the dependent variables and the regressors.17 Note
that these restrictions eliminate only few observations. Most of those who in 1991 reported
their primary job to be in manufacturing already satisfy these criteria.
15As explained in the Appendix, for my period of interest, the income data is available only for 1992
and every odd year between 1993 and 2005, with extremes included. I use the Personal Consumption
Expenditures index (PCE) to express all the dollar amounts in terms of 2007 dollars.
16I impose this restriction because in 1991 the EHI and ERP availability questions are asked only to
workers who are not self-employed and work at least 20 hours a week.
17I keep in the sample a respondent who, for some years, is in the universe of a EHI (or ERP) benefit
question but has a missing value on that question. I simply treat that the missing value as a zero in the sum
of benefits across years and control for the number of years with missing values in the regression. However,
I drop from the sample the few respondents who, while being in the universe of a EHI (or ERP) benefit
question, have missing values for that question for all years. In the estimation I control for the number of
years with missing values on the question of interest.
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I merge the NLSY79 data on workers in manufacturing in 1991 with the industry level
information discussed below. The trade regressors are not available for few manufacturing
industries and so I have to drop the workers who worked in those industries in 1991.18 There
are also three manufacturing industries in which no NLSY79 respondent was working in 1991
and so my sample contains no workers from those industries in 1991.19 This leaves me with
a sample of 989 workers in 70 di↵erent manufacturing industries.
4.2 Main Regressor and Other Control Variables
As to the main regressor in (3), data on M chnj,06 , M
chn
j,91 , Mj,91 and EXj,91 are from the UN-
Comtrade trade data while data on Yj,91 is from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry
Database dataset (NBER-CES hereafter).20 Other industry level variables are also from the
NBER-CES. I download the trade data at the 6-digit level using the Harmonized Commod-
ity Description and Coding System for 1988 and 1992. I then use the crosswalk provided
by David Dorn on his website to aggregate the UN-Comtrade data with the 4-digit level
Standard Industry Classification 1987 (SIC1987 hereafter). This allows me to match the
trade data with the industry shipment data Yj,91 and other industry level controls which are
both available at the SIC1987 from the NBER-CES dataset. The NLSY79 has information
about the industry of the primary job of the respondent: the NLSY79 uses the 3-digit Census
Industrial Classification. In order to merge the industry level variables with the NLSY79, I
aggregate the data from the 4-digit SIC1987 level to the Census 3-digit level. I aggregate the
18The industries with missing trade data are: Food industries, not specified ; Dyeing and finishing textiles,
except wool and knit goods ; Newspaper publishing and printing ; Logging ; Metal industries, not specified ;
Machinery, not specified ; Electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies, not specified ; Manufacturing indus-
tries, not specified.
19These industries are: Agricultural chemicals; Leather tanning and finishing ; Watches, clocks, and clock-
work operated devices .
20I download the trade data from the World Integrated Trade Solution website.
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variables by summing them. So, for example, I obtain M chnj,91 for the 3-digit Census Indus-
try Classification j by summing the Chinese imports for all the 4-digit SIC1987 industries
which are matched to industry j. When the sample restrictions are applied, this leaves me
with data for 70 3-digit manufacturing industries. More details on the construction of the
industry-level variables are contained in the Data Appendix.
I use very similar control variables to the ones used in Autor et al. (2014). Some of
the individual level regressors - Xi in regression (2) - are measured in 1991: age, dummies
for female, Black, Hispanic, foreign born, work experience, tenure at current employer, edu-
cation categories dummies (high-school drop-out, high-school diploma, some college, college
diploma, post-graduate studies), employer size categories dummies (1-49, 50-499, 500+), and
dummies for being covered by collective bargaining agreement, being married and being a
married female.21 I include marital status and its interaction with the female dummy, as a
worker may not be interested in having health insurance through his own employer if he gets
EHI coverage through the employer of his spouse. In all regressions I also control for the
1991 values of EHI availability, ERP availability and total of other fringe benefits available
as these values could be correlated with fringe benefits in later years.
Some of the other individual level regressors Xi come from more than one year of data.
Given that the demand for benefits by workers may vary with income, I control for the log
of average income between 1988 and 1991. Given that one has to work to participate in EHI
and ERP, years of employment in the 1992-2006 period are almost mechanically correlated
with the dependent variables. I control for years of employment during the period of interest
21The NLSY79 reports work experience in hours. I divide it by 2000 to transform it to years of work
experience for someone who works 40 hours a week 50 weeks a year. Tenure at current employer is instead
reported in weeks. I divide it by 50 to transform it to years of tenure for someone who works 50 weeks a year.
The Data Appendix describes the education categories and the collective bargaining agreement variable more
in detail.
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in order to partial out the e↵ect of Chinese imports on employment and so its mechanical
e↵ect on the dependent variable. Analogously, the total years with a EHI (ERP) benefit is
likely to be lower if in some years one is not interviewed or has a missing value on the benefit
dummy. To this end, I include the total number of interviews in the 1992-2006 period and I
also include in the Totehipi (Toterppi) regression the total number of years with an invalid
missing value on the ehipi,t (erppi,t) dummy and I include in the Totothfi regression the
total number of invalid missing values on the benefits dummies used to compute othfi.22
Kj,91 in regression (2) is a vector including several industry level controls. First, an
industry may be exposed to trade shocks other than the Chinese imports one, which is
the focus here. While the instrument should capture the variation which is unique to the
Chinese imports shock, I also control for the industry’s overall import penetration in U.S.
in 1991, which includes imports not just from China but from all countries. To compute
overall industry import penetration I also use the trade flows from UN-Comtrade data.
Second, I include variables from the NBER-CES dataset. Classic alternatives to trade-based
explanations of labor market outcomes are the ones based on technological change. Following
Autor et al. (2014), I use the capital/value added ratio and the production workers share of
employment, both measured in 1991, to proxy how much an industry is likely to be exposed
to technological change. Working in an industry that pays well in 1991 may also predict how
many years of benefits a worker will receive in the 1992-2006 period. For this reason, I also
add as control the log of the average industry payroll in 1991. Finally, the Chinese imports
shock may be correlated with secular industry trends which a↵ect the benefits o↵ered in an
industry. Again, following Autor et al. (2014), I also control for the pre-1991 industry trends
22A question may have a missing value because it is Validly Skipped as the respondent is not in the universe
of the question. For our dependent variables this usually happens because the respondent does not report
any job when interviewed. I control for these valid skips by controlling for the total number of years with a
job during the period of interest.
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by including the change in industry employment share and the change in the log average
industry wage during the 1976-1991 period. These variables are originally available at the
SIC1987 4-digit level in the NBER-CES data. I aggregate the original variables by summing
them across 4-digit industries within a single 3-digit Census 1990 industry.23
4.3 Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics are contained in Table 1. Blacks and Hispanics are over-represented
in this sample because the NLSY79 over-samples these groups. Following Chapter 2 of the
NLSY79 User Guide, I do not weigh the regressions, but instead use dummy variables for
Blacks and Hispanics (see Zagorsky and White (1999)). The workers in the sample are
between 26 and 34 years old in 1991, because the NLSY79 follows a fixed cohort over time.
The majority of the workers in the sample are male and non-foreign born. In 1991 the
majority of the sample is married and with no more than high-school education; they have
on average 10 years of work experience and more than 60% of them work for an employer
who has at least 100 employees; only about 21% of them are covered by collective bargaining
agreements.
The variables measured during the 1992-2006 period contain information on at most nine
years (if a workers is always interviewed) because the NLSY79 is collected biennially since
1994. During this period many workers have EHI and ERP benefits available through their
job but fewer workers also opt to participate in those benefits - on average, about five years
out of nine for EHI and about three years out of seven for ERP.24 On average, an individual
in the sample has 38 other fringe benefits available during the 1992-2006 period. Note that,
23For fractions - such as the capital/value added ratio - I first aggregate capital and value added at the
3-digit level and then recompute the ratio at the more aggregate 3-digit level.
24Information for ERP participation is available only since 1994 and so the maximum possible amount of
years with ERP benefits is seven.
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as one could have available at most all the other nine benefits in all the nine survey years,
the theoretical maximum of this variable is 81. Given our sample restrictions, the sample is
composed of individuals with high labor force attachment: on average a respondent reports
a job in eight out of nine survey years.
As Figure 1 shows, EHI availability and coverage are increasing in income. Table 1 in
the Appendix confirms that this is the case also for ERP participation and the total of other
fringe benefits available.25 This is compatible with benefits being a luxury good for workers.
A worker in the sample is exposed on average to a change in the exposure to Chinese
imports of about 9 percentage points between 1991 and 2006. However, there is a wide
variation around this mean, with some industries being more highly exposed and other
industries having no increase in Chinese imports in real terms (Figure 2 in the Appendix
shows the five most, and least, exposed industries). The regressions below leverage this
variation to estimate the e↵ect of U.S. exposure to Chinese imports on fringe benefits.
5 Results
5.1 Employer-Sponsored Benefits
As dependent variables, I use Totehipi, i.e the total number of years with participation in
EHI, Toterppi, i.e total number of years with participation in ERP, and Totothfi, i.e. the
total number of other fringe benefits available. Table 2 contains the results from OLS and
IV regressions of the model in (2).
25The graphs in Figure 1 and in the Appendix are obtained by using a Lowess smoothing. Loosely speaking,
the Lowess smoothed value of health benefits availability (a 0-1 dummy) for e.g. the median income is
obtained as a weighted average of the health benefits availability dummies for observations with income
“close” to the median income, with closer observations receiving a higher weight. See the the discussion of
the Lowess command in StataCorp (2013).
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As to the OLS results, the coe cients on  IPj are positive in all regressions and statisti-
cally significant for years with participation in EHI and ERP benefits. In terms of economic
magnitude, consider that the inter-quartile range for  IPj is 0.103 (i.e. 10.3 percentage
points). So, a worker at the 75th percentile of  IPj is expected, other things equal, to have
a number of years with participation in EHI higher by about 0.3 than a worker who is at the
25th percentile. This e↵ect is about 5.5% of the sample mean of the dependent variable.26
The e↵ect for years with ERP benefits is 4.9% of the sample mean.
As to the individual level variables, being foreign born is negatively correlated with years
with ERP and with other benefits available. The coe cient on theMarried dummy indicates
that there is a marriage premium for men in terms of all benefits. The marriage premium
is actually negative for women as it can be seen by adding the coe cients on the Married
and Married Female dummies. The omitted education category is workers with less than
high-school. The coe cients indicate that usually the higher the education, the higher the
years with benefits, with the only exception being that the Some College dummy is not
significant in the Totehipi regression.
Other coe cients indicate that more years with benefits can be expected for workers who,
in 1991, worked for larger employers and had benefits available.27 Having a higher income
in the 1988-1991 period also increases the expected number of years with EHI participation.
As expected, the number of years with a job increases the number of years with benefits
through the worker’s employer.
As for the industry level controls, working for an industry with a high employment share of
production workers in 1991 is strongly associated with having fringe benefits in later years.
26The sample mean of the dependent variable from Table 1 is 5.49 and 2.94*0.103/5.49 is approximately
equal to 0.055.
27Even and Macpherson (2012) also study the e↵ect of employer size on benefits.
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Similarly, being in 1991 in an industry with high industry payroll is also associated with
more years with benefits. The coe cients on overall import penetration in 1991 are instead
negative and significant in some specifications.28 The variables capturing industry trends
are not significant which suggests that our estimates on  IPj do not capture pre-existing
industry trends, a result confirmed by a falsification test in Section 5.3. The coe cients
on the total number of interviews and the total number of invalid missing values for the
dependent variable are not significant.
As to the IV results, all the coe cients on IPj are all positive and statistically significant
even though the one in the Toterppi regression only at the 10% level. The p-values of the
C-statistic indicate that  IPj is endogenous in the Totehipi and Totothfi regressions and
so that, at least for these two regressions, the use of an instrument is appropriate.29 The
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic is quite large indicating that our instrument is not weak (Stock
and Yogo (2005)). In the IV regressions, the estimates on  IPj are larger in absolute value
than with OLS. Using the same calculations as above, a worker at the 75th percentile of
 IPj is expected, other things equal, to have Totehipi, Toterppi and Totothfi higher by,
respectively, 0.5, 0.22 and 1.84: these e↵ects are, respectively, 9.2%, 6.9% and 4.8% of the
respective sample means. The estimates on the other coe cients are very similar to the
OLS regression both in magnitude and significance. Overall, both the OLS and IV results
suggest that those who in 1991 work in an industry which is about to experience a larger
Chinese imports shock are more likely to participate or have benefits available during the
1992-2006 period, even after controlling for their years of work and several other individual
28The results are robust to adding separately to the regression both Chinese import penetration in 1991
and non-Chinese import penetration in 1991, instead of just overall import penetration in 1991.
29I use the ivreg2 command for the IV regression (Baum et al. (2003)). The C-statistic is analogous
to the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test statistic with the di↵erence that the C-statistic is robust to violations of
conditional homoskedasticity. This is appropriate here as I am clustering the standard errors at the industry
level.
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and industry level controls.
5.2 Cumulative Income
To study the e↵ect of Chinese imports on monetary compensation, I compute cumulative
income over the period 1992-2005, normalized by average income in years 1988-1991 (see
Section 4.1 for details on this variable). I then regress cumulative income on the same set
of regressors used in the regressions in Table 2.30 Table 3 reports the coe cient on the
change in U.S. exposure to Chinese imports for the OLS and IV regressions (tables 1 and 2
in the Appendix report the estimated coe cients for all regressors). The e↵ect of  IPj is
estimated to be negative in the OLS regression but positive in the IV regression: however,
the coe cient is not statistically significant in either regression.
My income results are in contrast to Autor et al. (2014) who - by using Social Security
data - find a negative and statistically significant e↵ect of exposure to Chinese imports on
earnings from labor. This discrepancy may arise for various reasons. First, because of data
availability, my regressions use industry variation at the 3-digit level while Autor et al. (2014)
have 4-digit data: the negative e↵ect of Chinese imports may be lost with a more coarse
industry classification like mine. Second, the NLSY79 is a survey and so it may contain
more measurement error on labor income variable than administrative data. For example,
di↵erently from the Social Security data, the NLSY79 top codes income.
It is important to note that exposure to Chinese imports can, at least in theory, have a
positive and significant e↵ect on benefits but not on monetary compensation. The simple
model in Section 2 illustrates di↵erent ways through which this can happen. For example,
import competition may increase a worker’s productivity which in turn likely increases the
30The only di↵erence is that in the income regression I control for years with invalid missing values on
income rather than on benefits.
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total amount that an employer is willing to pay the worker. With a higher total compensation
o↵ered, if benefits are a luxury good, the worker may opt to increase benefits relatively more
than wages. Then, empirically, we would expect a trade shock to increase both benefits
and wages but to have a more pronounced e↵ect on benefits. This mechanism is somewhat
compatible with my results: the change in exposure to Chinese imports is associated with a
statistically significant increase in benefits and with an increase in income (according to the
IV results) which however is not statistically significant.
5.3 Robustness Checks
Table 4 reports a series of robustness checks of the previous results. Overall, the findings
in Table 2 are confirmed: the change in U.S. exposure to Chinese imports is positively and
significantly associated with an increase in fringe benefits. The e↵ect is stronger on EHI
and other fringe benefits and more tenuous for ERP benefits. The regressions also pass a
falsification test similar to the one conducted in Autor et al. (2014). Note that in performing
the robustness checks I use instrumental variable regressions using, as in Table 2, the change
in exposure of other wealthy countries to Chinese imports as instrument for the change in
U.S. exposure to Chinese imports. As regressors, for each dependent variable, I use the same
regressors used in Table 2. I now discuss each robustness check more in detail.
First, as discussed in the Appendix, the wording of the NLSY79 question related to EHI
and ERP participation change since 2002. To make sure that this change does not a↵ect
my results, I rerun the EHI and ERP participation regressions in Table 2 but keeping only
data up to 2000 (column 1 of Table 4). For completeness, I also rerun the regression for the
availability of other fringe benefits. Second, I restrict the sample only to those individuals
who, during the period of interest, were interviewed each year and reported a job each year
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(column 2 of Table 4). The results are similar to the ones in Table 2. The change in U.S.
exposure to Chinese imports is positive and significantly associated with years with EHI
participation and with the availability of other fringe benefits; the e↵ect on years with ERP
participation is positive in both columns but weakly significant only in column 2.
Totehipi and Toterppi measure the total number of years with a given benefit during the
period of observation. As such, they can only take integer values up to the maximum number
of years a worker is observed. Due to this limited range, a linear regression model may be
misspecified. As a robustness check, I also use an instrumental variable Poisson model.31
According to the Poisson model, the dependent variable follows a Poisson distribution. Given
this assumption, the instrumental variable Poisson model is estimated using the generalized
method of moments. To apply these models to my data I also have to redefine the dependent
variables. Indeed, Totehipi and Toterppi are skewed to the left because most workers in the
sample have EHI and ERP in all years. Since the Poisson distribution has always a positive
skewness, Poisson models are usually applied to data which are skewed to the right. For
this reason, I compute the number of years without EHI and the number of years without
ERP and I use those as dependent variables instead.32 I report the estimated coe cients
after multiplying them by minus one. In this way, I obtain back the sign of the e↵ect of the
change in U.S. exposure to Chinese imports on years with benefits, rather than years without
benefits: this facilitates the comparison of the sign of the coe cients with those in Table 2.
Panel A and B of column 3 in Table 4 report the coe cients on  IPj from such regressions:
again, the results are in line with the ones from the baseline model. Note that Totothfi is a
31For a mathematical statement of the implemented instrumental variable Poisson model, see the Methods
and Formulas sections for the ivpoisson Stata command in StataCorp (2013).
32More formally, I use as dependent variables #SY  Totehipi for EHI participation and #SY 94 Toterppi
for ERP participation where the operator # returns the cardinality of a set and SY and SY 94 have been
defined above.
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sum (across years) of sums (within year) of the other fringe benefits available to a worker.
As such, it has a larger range and so it su↵ers less from the limited range that Totehipi and
Toterppi display. Nonetheless, for completeness, I estimate an instrumental variable Poisson
model for Totothfi too.33 The coe cient on  IPj from this regression (Panel C, column 3)
is positive and highly significant, confirming the findings in Table 2.
It is possible that the baseline regressions pick up some individual trends in benefits
which were already ongoing in 1991 and which may be spuriously correlated with the change
in the U.S. exposure to Chinese imports. To alleviate this concern, I compute the total
years with the availability of, respectively, EHI, ERP and other fringe benefits for the years
since 1988 to 1991, a period which precedes the Chinese imports shock. I then regress these
dependent variables (column 4 of Table 4) on the same set of regressors as the baseline model
(2). Notably, the coe cients are all negative and only the one for EHI is weakly significant.
This result casts doubts on the possibility that our regressions pick up pre-existing trends
in benefits.
Finally, I also run two regressions with the availability of, respectively, EHI and ERP as
dependent variables (Panel A and B in column 5 of Table 4). The results are similar to the
ones obtained using EHI and ERP participation. Note that the entry in Panel C of column
5 is empty because we have already studied the availability of other fringe benefits in Table
2.
33As Totothfi is not skewed, I do not need to redefine the dependent variable and so I use Totothfi as
regressand.
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6 Conclusion
While many studies have focused on the impact of trade with developing countries on U.S.
wages, not much attention has been devoted to the impact of trade on other components of
compensation. I argue that if trade a↵ects the share of benefits in compensation, the studies
which focus on wages and ignore fringe benefits likely give us biased estimates of the e↵ect
of trade on workers’ total compensation and consumption.
I combine individual level data on fringe benefits from the NLSY79 with data on Chinese
imports at the industry level. I estimate a positive and significant e↵ect of Chinese imports
on fringe benefits. Previous studies such as Autor et al. (2014) find a negative e↵ect of trade
with China on U.S. workers’ wages. My results instead suggest a more optimistic view of the
e↵ect of trade with China on U.S. workers’ overall compensation. However, relative to the
previous literature, my results have some limitations due to the sample on which they are
based. First, the NLSY79 only cover a specific cohort of workers; second, survey data likely
contains more measurement error on income than Social Security data; third, I only have
information at the 3-digit industry level and so I cannot exploit 4-digit industry variation
in Chinese imports. Nonetheless, this paper o↵ers a first step toward studying the e↵ect of
trade on employer-sponsored benefits which are a now large component of compensation of
U.S. workers.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Total Years with EHI Available, 1992-2006 6.57 2.63
Total Years with Participation in EHI, 1992-2006 5.49 2.93
Total Years with ERP Available, 1992-2006 5.62 2.94
Total Years with Participation in ERP, 1992-2006 3.23 2.42
Total Other Fringe Benefits Available, 1992-2006 38.29 17.77
Total Income (1992-2005)/Mean Income (1988-1991) 9.27 7.66
Change U.S. Exposure to Chinese Imports, 1991-2006 0.09 0.13
Change Wealthy Countries Exposure to Chinese Imports, 1991-2006 0.06 0.08
Age (1991) 29.5 2.23
Female 0.35 0.48
Hispanic 0.18 0.38
Black 0.26 0.44
Foreign Born 0.06 0.25
Married (1991) 0.6 0.49
Married Female (1991) 0.2 0.4
Less Than High-School (1991) 0.14 0.34
High-School (1991) 0.54 0.5
Some College (1991) 0.17 0.38
College or More (1991) 0.15 0.36
Employer Size, 1-49 (1991) 0.27 0.44
Employer Size, 50-499 (1991) 0.43 0.5
Employer Size, 500+ (1991) 0.3 0.46
Work Experience (2000s hours) (1991) 10.17 3.41
Years worked with Current Employer (1991) 4.68 4.04
Covered by Collective Bargaining Agreement (1991) 0.21 0.41
Log Mean Wage and Salary Income 1988-1991 ($2007) 10.21 0.63
Health Insurance Available through Employer (1991) 0.88 0.33
Retirement Plan Available through Employer (1991) 0.68 0.47
Number of Other Fringe Available (1991) 4.77 2.2
Years Reported a Job 1992-2006 (max=9) 7.94 1.7
Import Penetration (All Countries) in U.S. (1991) 0.16 0.13
Capital/Value Added (1991) 0.95 0.49
Employment Share of Production Workers (1991) 0.70 0.13
Log Average Industry Payroll (1991) 10.53 0.28
Change in Industry Employment Share, 1976-1991 0 0.01
Change in Log Average Industry Wage, 1976-1991 0.83 0.09
Continued on next page...
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... table 1 continued
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Total Interviews 1992-2006 (max=9) 8.35 1.4
Years with Invalid Missing on EHI Available 0.01 0.12
Years with Invalid Missing on EHI Participation 0.01 0.1
Years with Invalid Missing on ERP Available 0.08 0.32
Years with Invalid Missing on ERP Participation 0 0.06
Invalid Missing Values on Other Fringe Benefits 1.58 2.23
Years with Invalid Missing Income 0.58 1.08
N 989
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Figure 1: Employer-Sponsored Health Benefits Availability and Participation by Income
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Data from main analysis sample described in Table 1. Information about employer-provided
health insurance participation is from 1990 as this information is not available in 1991.
Source: NLSY79
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Table 2: The E↵ect of Change in U.S. Exposure to Chinese Imports on the Total Years With Participation in
Employer-provided Health Insurance (Totehip), With Participation in Retirement Plan (Toterpp) and on Total
of Other Fringe Benefits (Totothf) Available, 1992-2006. OLS and IV Estimates. Continued on next page...
OLS IV
Totehip Toterpp Totothf Totehip Toterpp Totothf
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
  U.S. Exposure to Chinese Imports 2.94*** 1.54* 5.51 4.90*** 2.17* 17.91**
(0.79) (0.79) (5.66) (1.34) (1.21) (7.71)
Age (1991) -0.05** -0.05 -0.19 -0.05** -0.05 -0.20
(0.02) (0.03) (0.17) (0.02) (0.03) (0.17)
Hispanic 0.06 -0.06 1.19 0.08 -0.05 1.32
(0.21) (0.22) (1.32) (0.20) (0.21) (1.29)
Black 0.14 -0.11 1.96* 0.15 -0.10 2.04*
(0.18) (0.15) (1.10) (0.18) (0.15) (1.08)
Foreign Born -0.10 -0.89*** -3.10** -0.11 -0.89*** -3.14**
(0.27) (0.23) (1.24) (0.27) (0.22) (1.24)
Female 0.29 0.16 3.19*** 0.34 0.17 3.51***
(0.25) (0.18) (1.14) (0.24) (0.18) (1.11)
Married (1991) 0.35** 0.48*** 1.96* 0.36** 0.48*** 2.01**
(0.16) (0.14) (1.03) (0.15) (0.14) (1.01)
Married Female (1991) -1.05*** -0.72*** -2.43 -1.08*** -0.73*** -2.65
(0.29) (0.24) (1.71) (0.28) (0.24) (1.67)
High-School (1991) 0.54*** 0.48** 3.46*** 0.55*** 0.48** 3.51***
(0.20) (0.20) (1.15) (0.19) (0.19) (1.12)
Some College (1991) 0.36 0.71*** 5.04*** 0.36 0.71*** 5.07***
(0.28) (0.22) (1.32) (0.28) (0.22) (1.33)
College or More (1991) 0.89*** 1.04*** 6.95*** 0.90*** 1.05*** 7.01***
(0.31) (0.26) (1.67) (0.31) (0.26) (1.65)
Employer Size, 50-499 (1991) 0.21 0.27* 1.64** 0.18 0.26* 1.50**
(0.16) (0.15) (0.72) (0.15) (0.14) (0.72)
Employer Size, 500+ (1991) 0.50*** 0.39** 2.22** 0.50*** 0.38*** 2.16**
... table 2 continued
OLS IV
Totehip Toterpp Totothf Totehip Toterpp Totothf
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
(0.19) (0.15) (1.07) (0.18) (0.15) (1.07)
Work Experience (1991) 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.11
(0.03) (0.02) (0.18) (0.03) (0.02) (0.17)
Years with Employer (1991) 0.04** 0.02 0.10 0.04** 0.02 0.09
(0.02) (0.02) (0.12) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12)
Collective Bargaining (1991) 0.28* -0.14 -0.94 0.27* -0.14 -1.02
(0.17) (0.16) (0.67) (0.16) (0.15) (0.67)
Log Mean Income 1988-1991 0.83*** 0.58*** 3.01*** 0.83*** 0.58*** 2.96***
(0.19) (0.14) (1.00) (0.19) (0.14) (0.97)
Years Reported a Job 1992-2006 0.88*** 0.52*** 5.45*** 0.88*** 0.52*** 5.42***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.41) (0.06) (0.05) (0.40)
Employer Health Insurance Avail. (1991) 1.75*** 0.43** -0.71 1.79*** 0.44** -0.51
(0.29) (0.20) (1.43) (0.29) (0.20) (1.38)
Employer Retirement Plan Avail. (1991) 0.03 0.65*** 1.51* 0.04 0.65*** 1.59**
(0.19) (0.15) (0.80) (0.19) (0.14) (0.77)
Number of Other Fringe Available (1991) 0.03 0.06 2.69*** 0.03 0.06 2.67***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.22) (0.04) (0.04) (0.22)
Import Penetration in U.S. (1991) -1.52** -0.94 -2.88 -2.91*** -1.39 -11.67*
(0.71) (0.76) (4.88) (1.09) (1.02) (7.00)
Capital/Value Added (1991) -0.15 -0.14 -1.83 -0.28 -0.18 -2.63**
(0.19) (0.16) (1.20) (0.20) (0.16) (1.27)
Prod. Workers Empl. Share (1991) 2.72** 1.86** 4.25 3.83*** 2.22** 11.28*
(1.04) (0.81) (5.33) (1.25) (0.97) (6.08)
Log Average Industry Payroll (1991) 1.25*** 1.10** 6.86*** 1.90*** 1.31*** 10.97***
(0.43) (0.42) (2.46) (0.59) (0.50) (3.09)
Change in Employment Share 1976-1991 -5.14 -1.82 -89.21 -10.45 -3.54 -122.82*
(11.22) (9.35) (58.49) (11.89) (9.42) (70.12)
  Log Average Industry Wage 1976-1991 0.21 0.50 -0.03 -0.16 0.38 -2.35
... table 2 continued
OLS IV
Totehip Toterpp Totothf Totehip Toterpp Totothf
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
(1.05) (0.72) (4.53) (1.07) (0.71) (4.83)
Total Interviews 1992-2006 (max=9) -0.11 0.06 -0.16 -0.11 0.06 -0.13
(0.07) (0.05) (0.44) (0.07) (0.05) (0.43)
Total Invalid Missing Values on Totehip 0.35 0.36
(0.54) (0.53)
Total Invalid Missing Values on Toterpp -0.60 -0.58
(0.75) (0.73)
Total Invalid Missing Values on Totothf -0.02 -0.02
(0.17) (0.17)
Constant -25.84*** -21.26*** -123.99*** -32.90*** -23.54*** -168.67***
(5.21) (4.59) (30.40) (6.81) (5.50) (35.28)
Observations 989 989 989 989 989 989
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.43 0.59 0.50 0.43 0.59
Kleibergen-Paap F 43.06 42.82 42.81
C-Statistic p-value 0.03 0.42 0.03
Source: NLSY79, UN-Comtrade, NBER-CES. Clustered s.e. at the industry level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3: E↵ect of   U.S. Exposure to Chinese Imports
on Total Income (1992-2005)
OLS IV
b/se b/se
  U.S. Exposure to Chinese Imports -1.03 3.88
(1.99) (2.81)
Observations 989 989
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.28
Kleibergen-Paap F 43.26
C-Statistic p-value 0.05
The measure of total income is defined in Section 4.1. The
regressions also include all the independent variables of the
regressions reported in Table 2. Appendix Tables 1 and 2
report the coe cients for all these other independent vari-
ables. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level.
Source: NLSY79, UN-Comtrade, NBER-CES.
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Table 4: E↵ect of   U.S. Exposure to Chinese Imports: Robustness
Checks. IV regressions.
1992-2000 Always Working IV Poisson Benefits Benefits
Data And Interviewed 1992-2006 Availability Availability
1992-2006 1988-1991 1992-2006
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
A: Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance
3.05⇤⇤⇤ 6.03⇤⇤⇤ 1.84⇤⇤⇤ -0.73⇤ 2.79⇤⇤
(0.92) (1.49) (0.66) (0.43) (1.26)
B: Employer-Sponsored Retirement Benefits
1.10 3.32⇤ 0.73 -0.53 2.31
(0.75) (1.85) (0.48) (0.47) (1.45)
C: Employer-Sponsored Other Fringe Benefits
14.15⇤⇤⇤ 15.36⇤ 0.74⇤⇤⇤ -1.07
(4.94) (8.98) (0.24) (2.01)
Each entry in the table reports the coe cient and the standard error of the
change in U.S. exposure to Chinese imports - as measured in equation (3) -
from an instrumental variable regression with the instrument defined in equa-
tion (4). All the regressions in Panel A, B and C also include all the other
regressors in the corresponding columns in Table 2. I first compute the depen-
dent variables in Table 2, i.e. Totehipi, Toterppi and Totothfi, for the survey
years since 1992 to 2000 and use these as dependent variables: the results are
in column 1. Column 2 contains the results from the same IV regressions as in
Table 2 but keeping only respondents who are interviewed in all survey years
in the 1992-2006 period and always work in these years. Column 3 re-runs
the corresponding regressions in Table 2 but using an IV Poisson model (see
the text for the model specification). In column 4, Panel A, B and C use
as dependent variables the total years with availability through the employer
of, respectively, health insurance, retirement benefits and other fringe benefits
where these totals are computed for the pre-shock 1988-1991 years. Panel A
and B in Column 5 use as dependent variables the total years with availability
through the employer of, respectively, health insurance and retirement bene-
fits. Note that Table 2 already reports the results for the availability of other
fringe benefits for this period and so the entry in column 5, Panel C is omitted.
In column 1, N=989, 976 and 988 in, respectively, Panel A, B and C. In col-
umn 4 N=972, 968 and 972 in, respectively, Panel A, B and C. For all panels,
N=609 in column 2 and N=989 in column 3 and 5. Source: NLSY79, UN-
Comtrade, NBER-CES. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Appendix Fringe Benefits and Import Competition
I More Information on Worker-Level Variables
I.1 Benefits Variables
Let Bi,t indicate either EHIPi,t or ERPPi,t, the dummies for, respectively, participation in
EHI and participation in ERP. To construct the dependent variables Totehipi and Toterppi
in regression (2) in the text we need to sum Bi,t over time. To this end, we need information
on Bi,t which is consistent over the 1992-2006 period. The NLSY79 contains questions related
to these dummies. The answers to these questions are coded in di↵erent NLSY79 variables.
As discussed below, these variables need further processing to be used in the construction of
the Bi,t dummies.
In order to obtain consistent information over time on the Bi,t dummies, we need to
address the fact that the universe and wording of some of these questions change over time.
I first describe the wording and universe of the questions more in detail below. Finally, a
given individual may have a missing value for a certain Bi,t dummy in a certain year and so
I then turn to discuss how to handle these cases.
I.1.1 Availability of Health, Pension Benefits and Other Fringe Benefits
As to the EHI availability, the NLSY79 asks: “Does/Did your employer make available to you
medical, surgical, or hospital insurance that covers injuries or major illnesses o↵ the job?”.
As to the ERP availability, the NLSY79 asks: “(Does/Did) your employer make available
to you a retirement plan other than Social Security?”. As to the other fringe benefits, the
NLSY79 also asks whether the employer makes available to the respondent: life insurance;
dental benefits; maternity/paternity leave; flexible hours or work schedule; profit sharing;
training or educational opportunities; company provided or subsidized childcare; sick days;
2
Appendix Fringe Benefits and Import Competition
vacation days.1
These questions have been asked during each survey year except 1981. As to the universe
of the questions, note that these questions were asked only about the primary job from 1980-
93; they have been asked about all jobs beginning in 1994. In my data I keep information
only on the primary job for all years.2 These questions are asked in the Section 5 of the
questionnaire for the years 1991-1992, Section 6 in 1993, and in the Employer Supplement
(Section 7) for the years 1994-2012. These questions are asked in a fairly consistent way over
time. The only issue with them is the change in the universe of the question in 1994 which,
as argued in the Missing Values section below, a↵ects only few observations in my sample.
I.1.2 Participation in Health Benefits
The EHI and ERP availability questions are asked in the Employer Supplement of the sur-
vey and so they can be associated to a specific job. On the other hand, the questions with
information on health insurance coverage are contained in the Health section of the ques-
tionnaire and not in the Employer Supplement. For this reason they cannot be directly tied
to a specific job. However, note that this issue does not a↵ect my main regressions as I use
as dependent variable the total EHI coverage over time, independently from information on
the employer over time.
The wording of the EHI participation questions changes over time. The questions with
information on health insurance coverage are asked in 1990 and the period 1992-2006. As
to the health insurance coverage, in 1990 and the period 1992-2006, the NLSY79 asks: “Are
1Since 1991 the NLSY79 asks about the number of sick and about the number of vacation days. For these
two benefits I create two Bi,t dummies which are equal to 1 if the number of sick, respectively, vacation days
are positive and zero otherwise.
2Documentation on the universe of the question about availability of EHI and ERP is available here:
http : //nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy79/topical   guide/employment/fringe  benefits
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you covered by any kind of private or government health or hospitalization plans or health
maintenance organization (HMO)? Examples of health and hospitalization insurance plans
include Blue Cross, Blue Shield (Medicaid/Medi-Cal/Medical Assistance/Welfare/Medical
Services”. Because this question is in the Health section of the questionnaire, it is asked
virtually to everybody.3
If the interviewee answers that he is covered, then he is asked about the source of the
coverage, his current employer being an option. The question about the source of coverage
varies through the years. Since 1992 to 2000 the questions asks: “What is the source of your
health or hospitalization plan? Is it from a policy from your current or previous employer, (a
policy from (your) [Spouse/partner’s name]’s current or previous employer), a policy bought
directly from a medical insurance company, is it (Medicaid or an alternative Medicaid [name
of state Medicaid Program]/Welfare/Medi-Cal/Medical Assistance/Medical Services), or is
it from some other source? (SELECT ALL THAT APPLY.)”.
For the years up to 2000, I set the EHI participation dummy equal to 1 if the respondent
answers that he is covered and that his current employer is the source of the coverage. I set
the EHI participation dummy equal to 0 if the respondent answers that he is not covered at
all or if he answers that he is covered and he indicates that the current employer is not the
source.
The question is asked di↵erently in 2002, 2004 and 2006. In these years the interviewee
is first asked the same question reported below for the 1992-2006 period. If he answers yes,
then he is asked if he has had any employment since the last interview. If he answers yes, he
is then asked if he is currently employed (notice that these screening questions were not asked
before 2002). If he still answers yes, then finally he is asked if his current employer pays for
3Hence, the corresponding NLSY79 variable has very few missing observations, except, obviously, for
those who are not interviewed.
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any part of the cost of this plan. If he also answers yes, then he is asked: “Does your current
employer pay the total cost of the premiums for this health plan, or do you also have to
contribute toward the cost?” (italics mine) with the choices being “Employer pays total cost
of premiums” and “Employer pays part of costs and employee pays the rest”. So for 2002,
2004 and 2006 we have the option of considering somebody covered with employer-sponsored
health insurance when her employer pays any part, or the total, of the premium. I choose
the first option because in this way the mean for this variable across di↵erent years is more
uniform and avoids “jumps”. In other words, it is likely that when the NLSY79 asks about
health coverage in other years, without distinguishing the two options above (employer pays
any or all of the premium), respondents answer as if they were asked whether the employer
pays any part of the premium and not necessarily the whole premium.
Second, in the 1992-2000 period when the NLSY79 asks the EHI participation question,
the current and the former employer are distinct answers. But in the 2002-2006 period
the respondent’s former employer is grouped with the spouse former’s employer as a possible
answer. For this reason, throughout the 1992-2006 period, I set the EHI participation dummy
to 1 only if the respondent indicates the current employer as the provider of EHI. This will
miss the case of those who get EHI coverage through a former employer.
I.1.3 Participation in Pension Benefits
The ERP participation questions are available since 1994 only and their wording does change
over time.
As to the participation in retirement plan through an employer, up to 2000 the NLSY79
asks: “Many employers have pensions or retirement plans, and some employers provide
tax-deferred plans such as thrift, savings, 401Ks, profit-sharing, or stock ownership plans.
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(Are/Were) you included in any pension or retirement plans on your job with [employer]? Do
NOT include Social Security, IRA or Keogh plans.” I set the ERP participation dummy to
0 if the respondent answers negatively to this question. However, this question is ambiguous
because one can answer it a rmatively if the employer just o↵ers ERP to the worker or
if the worker actually participates in the ERP. The NLSY79 then asks “How many plans
[does/did] [Name of employer(1)] have for which you [are/were] eligible?”. I set the ERP
participation dummy to 0 if the respondent answers negatively to this question. Finally, the
respondent is asked “How many (of these) plans (are/were) you participating in?”. I set the
ERP participation dummy to 1 if the respondent answers that he is participating in one or
more ERP plans and I set the dummy to 0 if he reports zero plans.
The wording and ordering of the questions is slightly di↵erent in the 2002-2006 period
but I construct the ERP dummy according to the same logic: I set it to 1 if the respondent
answers to participate in at least one ERP plan and I set it to 0 if the respondent answers
that he is participating in zero ERP plans or if he answers negatively to one of the questions
that precede the “How many (of these) plans [are/were] you participating in? ” question.
I.1.4 Missing Values
In discussing missing values it is important to understand how they a↵ect my results. To
construct my dependent variables I sum dummies across years for a respondent. If one
has missing information on these dummies this could a↵ect the total sum. The NLSY79
distinguishes five types of missing values: “Refusal”; “Don’t Know”; “Invalid Skip”; “Valid
Skip”; “Non-interview”. I group the first three together, I count the total number of years
in which Bi,t is missing for these reasons and I add this variable to the regression. I also add
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the total number of interviews to the regression.4
As to the Valid Skip cases, a question is validly skipped because the respondent is not
in the universe of the question. We need to discuss these cases separately for the EHI
participation question. Indeed, we have seen above that the EHI participation question is
asked in the Health section of the NLSY79 and so it is asked virtually to everybody. The
only exception is for the years 2002-2006 where the question is validly skipped if somebody
is not currently employed. For this reason in the robustness checks I also run the regression
keeping only information up to year 2000 and in other specification keeping only those who
reported a job in each survey year. As to the questions related to ERP and to the availability
of other fringe benefits, a question can be validly skipped for di↵erent reasons. I list here
the main ones, indicating in parentheses the years for which each reason applies:
• The respondent did not work since the last interview (this issue a↵ects all survey years
in the 1992-2006 period and the baseline 1991 year). Obviously, if somebody does not
work, he will not get benefits through her employer. As explained in the paper, in
my regressions I control for total years of work to account for the lower total years of
benefits of somebody who is not working.
• The respondent works less than 20 hours a week at her primary job or is self-employed
in an unincorporated business (this issue a↵ects survey years 1991 and 1992). Note
that this a↵ects only few observations due to the sample restrictions I impose.5
• The respondent works less than 20 hours a week at her primary job and he answers
4There is even a more subtle way through which missing values a↵ect my results. Suppose that in each
year a respondent has a missing value on the Bi,t dummy of interest. In this case, I set the across-years sum
of Bi,t to zero. Indeed, I do not want to include in my sample a respondent with missing values on Bi,t for
all years. However, there are only few cases where this occurs.
5E.g. I keep only workers who worked at least 20 hours a week in 1991. So only few of them work less
than 20 hours a week in 1992
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negatively when asked if his primary job o↵ers any benefits (every survey year since
1993). In this case the interviewer stops and does not ask about specific benefits. The
respondents in my sample, almost each year, when they work, they work more than 20
hours a week.
• Missing information on the questions which determine the universe of the question (all
survey years in the 1992-2006 period). E.g. if the respondent does not know if the job
o↵ers any benefits, then it is possible that the benefit questions are not asked.
I.2 Other Worker-Level Variables
Let SY 93 be the set containing years 1993, and every even year between 1994 and 2006, with
extremes included. Let SY 93 1 be the set including the years in SY 93 minus one, i.e. 1992
and every odd year between 1993 and 2005, with extremes included. In each year in SY 93 the
respondent is asked about the total income from wages and salary that he earned in the past
calendar year.6 Let Wi,t be total income and salary for year t for respondent i. My income
dependent variable is then (
P
t2SY 93 1 Wi,t) divided by
1
4(Wi,1988+Wi,1989+Wi,1990+Wi,1991).
In words, the cumulative income between 1992 and 2005, for the years for which survey data
is available, expressed as a fraction of average income in 1988-991. This definition is similar
to the one of cumulative earnings in Autor et al. (2014). In my data the income values
are top coded. Instead, Autor et al. (2014) use Social Security data and so their earnings
data is not top coded. The NLSY79 income data are top coded as follows: up to 1994, all
income values above $100,000 are replaced with the average of the incomes above $100,000;
since 1996, all income values above the 98th percentile are replaced with the average of the
6This is the wording of the question: During the past calendar year, “how much did you receive from
wages, salary, commissions, or tips from all (other) jobs, before deductions for taxes or anything else?”
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incomes above the 98th percentile.7
The categories of the education variable are constructed based on the highest grade
completed as of May 1 of the survey year. The categories are created as follows: those
with less than grade 12 completed are High-School Drop-outs (the omitted category in the
regression); those with exactly grade 12 completed are in the High-School category; those
with more than grade 12, but less than grade 16, completed are in the Some College category;
those with at least grade 16 completed are in the College or More category. The NLSY79
computes the hours worked since the last interview. The experience variable is given by the
sum of those hours, divided by 2000. The division converts the variable to an yearly rate,
using as reference a job with 40 hours a week and 50 weeks a year. The NLSY79 does not
ask consistently about being in a union. In any event it is possible that a worker is not in a
union but that her benefits are a↵ected by a union because her job is covered by a collective
bargaining agreement. I follow Booth et al. (2010) in the construction of this variable.
II More Information on Industry-level Variables
II.1 Measure of Chinese Import Competition
Our measures of exposure to Chinese competition are similar to the ones in Autor et al.
(2013). Our regressor of interest and our instrument are described in, respectively, equation
(3) and equation (4) in the text. In our estimation sample we use data for 70 distinct
manufacturing industries at the 3-digit level. The construction of the measures and the data
sources are discussed below.
For the trade flows - i.e. the terms M chnj,06 , M
chn
j,91 , Mj,91 and EXj,91 in equations (3) and
7See here: http : //nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy79/topical   guide/income/income
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(4) - I use UN Comtrade data at the 6-digit level using the HS1988/92 classification; for
industry shipments (i.e. Yj,91 in equations (3) and (4)), I use the NBER-CES data at the
4-digit level with the SIC1987 classification; the NLSY data uses instead 3-digit Census
industry classification codes. I aggregate the trade data at the 4-digit level using a slightly
aggregated version of SIC1987 as in Autor et al. (2013). This allows me to merge the trade
data with the industry variables from the NBER-CES data. I then aggregate the data at
the 3-digit 1990 Census industry classification code and merge with the NLSY. I describe
these steps more in detail below.
II.2 UN-Comtrade Trade Data
We obtain trade data from the WITS website of the World Bank which in turn gets the data
from UN-Comtrade. For the 1991-2006 period and each available HS 6-digit industry, we
download: U.S. imports from the rest of the world; U.S. exports to the rest of the world;
U.S. imports from China; other wealthy countries’ imports from China. All the data are
converted to real 2007 dollars.8
In some years, for some of these industries one trade flow (e.g. U.S. exports) is non-
missing but another is missing (e.g. imports from China): in this case we set the flow
with a missing value to zero. In doing so, we follow the WITS User Manual, section B.2.1
which, regarding the WITS data, states that the “data is reported by statistical o ces
of each country to relevant international organizations. As a rule, missing country/period
data means that the reporting country had not reported data for that specific year. No
trade information for any given product (or product category) indicates a non-traded product
according to the reporting country” [italics, mine] World Bank (2011).
8All flows above are available in current dollars in the UN Comtrade data, even the imports from China
into other wealthy countries.
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In order to compute the expressions in (3) and (4), I need to merge the trade flows with
the NBER-CES data on shipments. To do so, I aggregate the UN Comtrade data from the
HS 1988/92 6-digit code to the SIC1987dd 4-digit code. The SIC1987dd slightly aggregates
the 4-digit industries in the SIC1987 used by the NBER. In this way every industry in
SIC1987dd can be associated to an industry in HS 1988/92. I use the crosswalk provided on
David Dorn’s website: the crosswalk indicates what share of a HS 6-digit industry should
be allocated to a SIC1987dd 4-digit industry. I then aggregate the NBER data at the
SIC1987dd level from the original SIC1987. Again, David Dorn’s website provides the file
for such recode.
The UN Comtrade data uses some special industry codes for oil-related trade flows.9
These codes are not in Dorn’s HS-SIC1987dd crosswalk. I aggregate these codes to the HS
1988/92 code 271000 which is instead contained in the crosswalk. Industry 3273 is in the
NBER-CES dataset but there is no trade flow for it in any years: this makes sense given that
3273 is ready-mixed concrete. I impute the trade flows to 0 for this industry in all years.
Industry 2992 (Lubricating oils and greases) is in the NBER-CES dataset but it has no trade
flow for many years since 2000. I drop all the observations for this industry. The value of
shipments in NBER is missing for some years for some industries.10 We drop these industries
from our dataset. This leaves us with a balanced panel of 395 SIC1987dd industries for 17
years.
9These codes are: 271012, 271013, 271014, 271016, 271021, 271022, 271025, 271026, 271027, 271029,
271093, 271095 and 271096.
10These industries are SIC 2411, 2711, 2721, 2731, 2741, 2771, 3292, 3732.
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II.3 Merging Industry Data with NLSY
The NLSY has information about the industry of the main job of the respondent. The
NLSY uses the 3-digit 1980 Census industrial codes (CIC1980) since 1982 to 2000. I recode
the CIC1980 codes to ind1990, which is the version of the 3-digit 1990 Census manufactur-
ing recode (CIC1990) which was developed by IPUMS. The IPUMS documentation on the
variable ind1990 contains some information on the relevant crosswalk. The full recode is
available here: https://usa.ipums.org/usa/vols 4 5 index.shtml (click on the ind1990 link).
In order to recode the 4-digit SIC1987 to 3-digit CIC1990, we rely on the crosswalk in
Appendix A of the Census Technical Paper 65, October 2003.11 Due to the di↵erent level of
aggregation, a given CIC1990 industry may be matched to more than one SIC1987 industry
(but a given SIC1987 industry will be matched to only a CIC1990 industry). We aggregate
the trade flows and the shipment variable at the CIC1990 level by adding them up across
SIC1987 industries: e.g. the imports from China for CIC1990 industry 111 will be given
by the sum of the imports from China for the SIC1987 industries associated to 111 in the
crosswalk, i.e. SIC1987 industries 2051, 2052 and 2053. We then compute the expressions
in (3) and (4) using these aggregated values.
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Figure 1: Employer-Sponsored Retirement Benefits and Other Fringes by Income
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Main analysis sample described in Table 1. Top panel: Employer-sponsored retirement ben-
efits availability (1991) and participation (1994) by mean income in 1988-1991; information
about participation in employer-provided retirement plan is from 1994 as this information
is not available before then. Bottom panel: all other available fringe benefits, other than
health insurance and retirement, by mean income in 1988-1991. Source: NLSY79
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Figure 2: Most and Least Exposed Industries to U.S. Chinese Imports
Change in Chinese import penetration between 1991 and 2006, as measured in equation
(3). Industries aggregated at the 3-digit Census 1990 level. Source: UN-Comtrade and
NBER-CES.
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Table 1: The E↵ect of Chinese Imports on Total Income (1992-2005), I (Continues)
OLS IV
b/se b/se
  U.S. Exposure to Chinese Imports -1.03 3.88
(1.99) (2.81)
Age (1991) -0.20 -0.20
(0.13) (0.13)
Hispanic -0.42 -0.37
(0.45) (0.43)
Black -0.46 -0.43
(0.38) (0.37)
Foreign Born -0.11 -0.12
(0.51) (0.50)
Female -2.03* -1.91*
(0.90) (0.85)
Married (1991) 1.27 1.29
(0.81) (0.80)
Married Female (1991) -0.00 -0.09
(0.69) (0.68)
High-School (1991) -0.16 -0.13
(0.81) (0.78)
Some College (1991) 1.81** 1.82**
(0.63) (0.61)
College or More (1991) 4.95*** 4.97***
(1.03) (1.03)
Employer Size, 50-499 (1991) -0.63 -0.68
(0.69) (0.67)
Employer Size, 500+ (1991) 0.02 -0.00
(0.62) (0.61)
Work Experience (1991) 0.13 0.14
(0.13) (0.13)
Years with Employer (1991) -0.04 -0.05
(0.07) (0.07)
Collective Bargaining (1991) 0.17 0.14
(0.33) (0.32)
Log Mean Income 1988-1991 -6.69* -6.71**
(2.57) (2.51)
Years Reported a Job 1992-2006 1.04*** 1.02***
(0.14) (0.13)
Observations 989 989
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Table 2: The E↵ect of Chinese Imports on Total Income (1992-2005), II (Continued)
OLS IV
b/se b/se
Employer Health Insurance Avail. (1991) -0.27 -0.19
(1.29) (1.24)
Employer Retirement Plan Avail. (1991) 0.79* 0.82**
(0.41) (0.41)
Number of Other Fringe Available (1991) 0.12 0.11
(0.17) (0.17)
Import Penetration in U.S. (1991) 1.95 -1.54
(2.12) (2.58)
Capital/Value Added (1991) -0.79 -1.11**
(0.48) (0.51)
Prod. Workers Empl. Share (1991) -0.91 1.87
(2.35) (2.25)
Log Average Industry Payroll (1991) 1.17 2.80*
(1.12) (1.52)
Change in Employment Share 1976-1991 -22.56 -35.89
(27.94) (28.79)
  Log Average Industry Wage 1976-1991 1.15 0.23
(2.94) (3.05)
Total Interviews 1992-2006 (max=9) 0.51*** 0.53***
(0.17) (0.17)
Years with Invalid Missing Income -1.59*** -1.59***
(0.11) (0.11)
Observations 989 989
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.28
Kleibergen-Paap F 43.26
C-Statistic p-value 0.05
Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. Source: NLSY79, UN-Comtrade, NBER-CES.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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